Regime design and cooperation: Differential treatment of parties in international environmental agreements by Castro, Paula
1 
 
 
Regime design and cooperation: Differential treatment of parties in international 
environmental agreements 
 
Paula Castro (castro@pw.uzh.ch) 
 
Department for Political Science and 
Center for Comparative and International Studies 
University of Zurich 
 
Paper prepared for the Panel “Designing Multilevel Policies and Institutions”  
ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, September 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
Many international environmental agreements (IEAs) have adopted differentiated rules for groups of 
countries, based on the recognition of the different circumstances of parties, such as special needs of 
certain parties (especially developing countries), or the different contribution of parties to the 
environmental problem at hand. The resulting differential treatment usually consists of differences in the 
stringency of obligations, different timing of their application, and/or international financial, capacity-
building or technological assistance. The existence (and design) of preferential treatment for some groups 
of parties may be a precondition for their entering the agreement in the first place. But in the long term, 
some types of preferential treatment may lead to new incentives that make broader (and deeper) 
cooperation more difficult, as observed for the climate change regime by Castro et al. (2011). 
In this article, I consider the relationship between the existence of differential treatment of parties to an 
IEA and the outcomes of the bargaining process that led to the adoption of the IEA as well as its 
effectiveness in terms of compliance and problem-solving. Following the literature on the rational design 
of international agreements, I regard country differentiation as akin to other flexibility provisions that are 
expected to facilitate deeper cooperation among parties. Using data from the International Regimes 
Database (IRD), I test whether country differentiation facilitates countries’ participation in an agreement, 
improves compliance of parties with the agreement’s provisions, and ultimately improves problem solving 
by the agreement.  
Keywords: International environmental agreements; regime design; negotiation; cooperation 
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Regime design and cooperation: Differential treatment of parties in international 
environmental agreements 
 
 “All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the 
international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.” 
1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law 
„[...] equity shall be reflected by having a fair sharing and equitable allocation framework wherein 
developed country Parties take the lead in undertaking deep binding emission reductions in the short-, 
mid- and long-term that reflect their historical and current responsibility for global emissions and in 
providing finance, technology and capacity building to developing countries.“ 
Submission by China, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand  
to the UNFCCC, 3 October 2011 
 
1. Introduction 
Differential treatment of parties to an international environmental agreement (IEA) has become a 
relatively common feature of international law. Several multilateral environmental agreements, including 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1994 
Convention to Combat Desertification, among others, have incorporated the notion of differentiated 
responsibility of states with respect to the protection of the environment. The basis of this differentiated 
responsibility is the recognition, already in Principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration, of countries’ 
different circumstances and levels of contribution to environmental degradation (UN 1992). The resulting 
differential treatment usually consists of less stringent obligations, different timing of the application of 
provisions (i.e. grace periods or delayed implementation of obligations, or priority implementation in 
specially affected countries), and international assistance in terms of financing, capacity building and/or 
technology transfer (Matsui 2002; Hepburn and Ahmad 2005). Beyond the environmental domain, also 
the World Trade Organization includes “Special and Differential Treatment” provisions for developing 
countries and Least Developed Countries, based on the notion that countries at different levels of 
development have different trade policy needs. Both in the context of the climate change convention and 
of the WTO it has already been noted that the created country categories have become rigid and are being 
considered as negotiation goals themselves: an academic discussion about how to make this differential 
treatment more flexible and dynamic has emerged (Berk and den Elzen 2001; Hoekman et al. 2004; 
Kasteng et al. 2004; Page and Kleen 2005; Castro et al. 2011; Winkler and Rajamani 2013). 
Legal scholars have examined such country differentiation in international agreements from a normative 
perspective (Cullet 1999; Halvorssen 1999; Rajamani 2000; Cullet 2003; Hoekman et al. 2004; Hepburn 
and Ahmad 2005; Page and Kleen 2005; Rajamani 2006; Honkonen 2009). They have detailed the 
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philosophical basis for the departure from the notion of equality to a notion of equity in international 
environmental law, discussed the arguments supporting and opposing the introduction of differential 
treatment and categorized the differential treatment provisions existing in several IEAs. Rajamani (2006), 
for example, classifies differential treatment provisions into those that differentiate with respect to the 
central obligations contained in the treaty (e.g. targets for only one group of countries), those that 
differentiate with respect to the implementation of obligations (e.g. delayed compliance schedules, 
different base years, softer non-compliance rules), and those that provide assistance to comply with 
obligations (capacity building, technology transfer, finance). Magraw (1989) has recognized that while 
some differential treatment provisions are explicit in the treaty texts, some are implicit, in the sense that 
the provision establishes identical treatment to all parties, but its application allows considering 
characteristics that vary from country to country (e.g. refer to a state's technical and regulatory ability or its 
resource availability).  
So far, however, there is no study that looks at the effect of differential treatment on the effectiveness of 
international agreements in a comparative manner. Such an analysis can provide evidence about why 
preferential treatment is agreed upon, how such preferential treatment is designed and what potential 
effects on the regime’s effectiveness it can have.  
Differential treatment of parties to an international agreement can be conceived as akin to the ‘flexibility 
provisions’ as defined by Rosendorff and Milner (2001). The academic debate around such flexibility 
provisions deals with whether they encourage countries to engage in deeper cooperation, or whether they 
rather make cooperation meaningless (Koremenos et al. 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008). One of the key 
challenges of the academic discussion is that such flexibility provisions are endogenous to the decision of 
countries to enter the agreement and to their level of commitment within the agreement. Fearon (1998) 
argues that there is a trade-off between efficient bargaining and effective agreements. In our case, the 
existence (and specific design) of preferential treatment for some groups of parties may be a precondition 
for their entering the agreement in the first place. But in the long term, some types of preferential 
treatment may lead to new incentives that make broader (and deeper) cooperation more difficult, as 
observed for the climate change regime by Castro et al. (2011). 
In this article, I consider the relationship between the existence of differential treatment of parties to an 
IEA and three types of outcomes of the bargaining process that led to the adoption of the IEA: (i) 
country participation in the agreement, (ii) compliance of parties with the agreement’s provisions, and (iii) 
solving the problem that the agreement was supposed to address. I do so by drawing on data from the 
International Regimes Database (IRD) on the formation, attributes and outcomes of 172 regime elements 
within 23 international environmental regimes. The article aims to contribute to the academic discussion 
on the trade-off between flexibility in regime design and efficient negotiations (Downs et al. 1996; Fearon 
1998; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008). 
The next section outlines the theory behind the hypotheses regarding the effects of differential treatment 
on IEA outcomes. Section 3 describes the operationalization, data and methods. The results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5 provides first conclusions and outlines areas for future research. 
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2. Differential treatment, cooperation and effectiveness of IEAs 
Institutionalist IR theory has recently devoted some attention to the study of the relationship between 
bargaining and depth of cooperation. As observed by Downs et al. (1996), the fact that many existing 
international regimes achieve good levels of compliance without much attention to enforcement may be 
due to the fact that most of these agreements require member states to make only small adjustments in 
policy, thus giving them little incentive to defect. Fearon (1998) responds by arguing that there is a trade-
off between the bargaining phase and the implementation and enforcement phase of international 
cooperation problems: the greater the gains from cooperation are expected, the harder will governments 
bargain, and the more difficult it will be to reach a cooperative outcome. There is thus a trade-off between 
efficient bargaining and effective agreements. In line with this argument, the work on flexibility in 
international agreements looks at whether including flexibility provisions in such agreements can facilitate 
cooperation in the first place (Koremenos et al. 2001; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 
2008). 
This article follows this existing literature to investigate the effect of differential treatment on three 
different measures of cooperation and regime effectiveness: (i) country participation in the agreement, (ii) 
compliance of parties with the agreement’s provisions, and (iii) solving the problem that the agreement 
was supposed to address.  
Differential treatment aims to satisfy the interests of particular parties that, while willing to be cooperate in 
the solution of an international problem, are in a disadvantaged situation to do so: either because their 
specific circumstances make cooperation more costly for them (e.g. developing countries usually argue 
that they first need to achieve development and reduce poverty before tackling environmental problems), 
or because they are not important contributors to the problem. Differential treatment may provide these 
countries with additional time to achieve specific commitments, may grant them technological or financial 
assistance to do so, or may exempt them altogether of commitments (see Appendix 1 for an overview of 
differential treatment provisions in some IEAs). Particularly if substantial heterogeneity exists across 
parties (or potential parties) to an agreement, differential treatment may make them easier to be ratified 
(Swanson 2001). At the same time, being party to the agreement allows these countries to have a voice 
(and, under the frequently used unanimity and consensus voting rules, even a veto) in future decision-
making within the regime. Being a party may also be tied to receiving certain benefits (in addition to the 
improvement of the environment, which is often a public good and hence non-excludable). It is to be 
expected, thus, that differential treatment will make it more attractive to states to become parties to the 
agreement. This is what I expect under hypothesis 1: 
H1: Differential treatment increases the likelihood that states will become parties to the agreement.  
As differential treatment provides support for some parties to comply with the agreement, in the form of 
financial and/or technical assistance, or through delayed compliance schedules, simplified commitments 
or exemptions, it is expected that the existence of differential treatment will improve parties’ compliance:  
H2: Differential treatment increases the likelihood that states will comply with the provisions of the agreement. 
Differential treatment grants specific privileges (financial and technical support, delayed compliance 
schedules, simplified commitments, etc.) to certain groups of countries. To the extent that some of these 
privileges water down the level of stringency of commitments to tackle the environmental problem at 
hand, differential treatment will reduce the effectiveness of the IEA in addressing the problem. In 
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addition, countries subject to these privileges – e.g. countries initially granted exemptions from economic 
or environmental obligations – have an incentive to lobby for the continuation or expansion of this 
preferential treatment in subsequent negotiation rounds. In the long term, this may prevent the evolution 
of the regime into a more inclusive one in which more countries take up commitments and actively 
contribute to the solution of the problem – differential treatment becomes path-dependent (Castro et al. 
2011). 
H3: Differential treatment reduces the likelihood that an agreement will be effective in solving the environmental problem 
being addressed.  
 
3. Operationalization, data and methods 
The hypotheses described above are tested in a multivariate logistic regression framework using data from 
the International Regimes Database (IRD) (Breitmeier et al. 1996; Breitmeier et al. 2006). The IRD is a 
very complete dataset describing, with over 200 variables, the formation, attributes and outcomes of 23 
international environmental regimes, which were coded by international experts on the basis of a common 
data protocol. Its unit of analysis is the “regime element”: a period of time within an environmental 
regime, in which the operation of the regime is continuous, and its principles, key norms, leading actors 
and functional scope remain broadly the same (Breitmeier et al. 1996). For example, the regime for Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) is subdivided into the following six regime elements: 
- LRTAP Convention 1979-1982 
- LRTAP Convention 1982 -1998 
- First Sulphur Protocol 1985-1998 
- NOx Protocol 1988-1998 
- VOCs Protocol 1991-1998  
- Second Sulphur Protocol 1994-1998. 
Each of these elements constitutes a separate observation in the dataset, because a significant change in 
the characteristics of the regime happened between them. Most regimes (and their regime elements) have 
been coded independently by two different experts. All in all, the dataset hence comprises 172 
observations (coded regime elements) within 23 regimes or issue areas.  
Dependent variables 
For the operationalization of two of the dependent variables, as well as for the selection of appropriate 
controls that are also expected to affect compliance and IEA effectiveness, this paper builds upon the 
regression models used in Breitmeier et al. (2011). To test the first hypothesis I use the variable 
signature_failure, which is based upon variable 109G of the IRD (NEGOTIATE_NO_SIGNATURE: 
Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail to sign the agreement reached?). This is 
clearly a very broad measure of the likelihood that states will become parties to the agreement, as it is just 
a binary indicator at the agreement level. IRD does not provide comparable figures about number of 
parties to an agreement, as the cases included have different universes of potential members, and have 
been negotiated at very different times. No comparable dependent variable was tested in Breitmeier et al. 
(2011), who only focused on the following two measures of effectiveness. According to hypothesis 1, I 
expect that differential treatment will have a negative effect on signature_failure.  
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The second hypothesis, on the likelihood that states will comply with the provisions of the agreement, is 
operationalized in the same way as in Breitmeier et al. (2011): the variables 
CONFORMITY_ALL_MEMBERS (Did all members generally conform with the provisions of the 
regime rules?) and CONFORMITY_CAUSAL (Did the regime have a causal influence on the degree of 
conformance of its members?) (both under variable 303A in the IRD) are first dichotomized and then 
multiplied to generate the variable effect_compliance. Effect_compliance hence takes the value of 1 if the 
regime had a causal positive influence on compliance, and zero in all other cases. It has a missing value 
whenever any of the two constituent variables also has a missing value. Following hypothesis 2, I expect 
that differential treatment will have a positive effect on effect_compliance.  
The third hypothesis on the effectiveness in terms of problem-solving, is again operationalized as in 
Breitmeier et al. (2011): the variables PROBLEM_CHANGE (How did the state of the world change 
during this period with respect to the problems addressed by the regime?) and 
PROBLEM_CHANGE_CAUSAL (Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?) 
(both under variable 304A in the IRD) are dichotomized and multiplied with each other to generate the 
variable effect_problemchange, which indicates whether the regime has had a positive causal effect on the 
improvement of the problem being addressed. In the IRD, PROBLEM_CHANGE and 
PROBLEM_CHANGE_CAUSAL are both coded at the problem level: for each regime element, one or 
several problems being addressed were identified, and these two variables were coded for each of these 
problems. To generate the variable at the regime element level, I take the mode of the values that the 
variables take at the problem level before dichotomizing them. Following H3, I expect that differential 
treatment will have a negative effect on effect_problemchange. 
Main explanatory variables 
The IRD dataset includes several variables that in some way or another depict differential treatment of 
states within a regime. The variable MEMBER_CATEGORY (208D in the IRD) asks whether there is a 
single category of membership or whether there are provisions establishing more than one category of 
membership. MEMBER_ROLE_DIFFERENTIATE (208E) asks whether the regime’s provisions allow 
for role differentiation among the members. Both variables are dichotomous and at the regime element 
level. In addition, the variable RULE_DIFFERENTIATE (205E) asks, for each substantive rule coded 
within each regime element, whether it differentiates among its members in terms of requirements, 
prohibitions, or permissions. Due to the slight nuances between these variables, it is likely that in some 
cases they are describing the same differentiation, but in others they are not. To capture whether there is 
any differentiation among members of the regime at all, I first create the variable DIFF_ANYRULE, 
which shows whether any rule within each regime element differentiates among its members, on the basis 
of RULE_DIFFERENTIATE. Then I generate the variable any_differentiation, which is coded as 1 if 
any one of the three variables, MEMBER_CATEGORY, MEMBER_ROLE_DIFFERENTIATE and 
DIFF_ANYRULE, is 1 (no matter if any one of the others has a missing value), and as zero otherwise. 
Any_differentiation is the main explanatory variable. 
Differential treatment of members to IEAs frequently appears in form of financial support. The IRD 
includes the variable FINANCIAL_MECHANISMS (211C) that describes each regime’s financial 
mechanism, including, inter alia, following categories: 3 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to support the 
regime's administration and national participation of developing countries; 4 = Trust fund or similar 
financial mechanism to compensate states for certain activities in the international/global interest; 5 = 
Trust fund or similar financial mechanism to subsidize national compliance; 6 = Trust fund or similar 
mechanism to protect resources that remain under national sovereignty. I create a dummy variable, 
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finance_devctys, that takes the value of 1 for all regimes in which FINANCIAL_MECHANISMS includes 
category 3, and a dummy variable finance_compensate, that takes the value of 1 for all regimes in which 
FINANCIAL_MECHANISMS includes 4, 5, or 6. Finance_devctys hence indicates whether the regime 
provides funding for developing countries’ participation in negotiations and meetings. 
Finance_compensate indicates whether the regime provides compensation or a subsidy for activities 
linked to compliance with its aims. While the IRD coding does not take into account that such 
compensation or subsidy payments may be themselves differentiated across member groups, it is possible 
that such financial support appears together with differentiation. Finance_devctys and 
finance_compensate will hence be tested as potential complements to any_differentiation. 
Controls 
Of course, participation in a regime, compliance and effectiveness do not depend solely on differential 
treatment of member parties. The literature on regime effectiveness supports the idea that the 
characteristics of the problem at hand are an important predictor of effectiveness, as well as the level of 
uncertainty with respect to the potential solutions to it, the distribution of power among the parties and 
the institutional characteristics of the regime (Mitchell 1994; Miles et al. 2002; Breitmeier et al. 2006). I 
follow Breitmeier et al.’s (2011) choice of explanatory variables to establish a baseline model of 
compliance and effectiveness. Problem_understood is a categorical variable describing how well the nature 
of the problem was understood (the higher its value, the better the understanding of the problem). It is 
based on variable 104A of IRD, which is coded at the problem level. Hence, problem_understood is 
summarized at the regime element level by taking the mode for each regime element. It is used as a proxy 
for the notion of level of uncertainty with respect to solutions to the environmental problem being 
addressed: the higher the understanding, the lower the uncertainty, and hence the higher the compliance 
with and the effectiveness of the regime. 
Problem malignancy is used in Breitmeier et al. (2011) to depict the level of complexity of the problem in 
terms of how incompatible the interests of the parties were and whether there was an incentive to disobey 
the rules of the regime. Accordingly, it is generated as the sum of the IRD variables 
INTEREST_DISOBEY and INTEREST_COMPATIB. The higher the malignancy, the lower the 
expected compliance and the effectiveness. Powersetting_asymmetry is included to control for the level of 
asymmetry between the nations involved in terms of issue-specific power resources.  
In terms of institutional variables, ruleused_mode describes the most frequent type of rule used in the 
regime’s decision-making processes (in increasing order, qualified majority, consensus, unanimity); 
deep_rules indicates whether the regime is deep with respect to the density and specificity of its rules; 
rulebinding indicates how strongly legally binding the regime’s rules are; and compliance_managerial 
indicates whether the regime uses a managerial approach to compliance (rather than an enforcement one).  
Appendix 2 describes all variables in more detail, including their summary statistics. Appendix 3 presents a 
correlation table.  
Methods 
The three hypotheses are tested using logistic regressions, with the errors clustered at the regime level to 
account for the non-independence between observations (regime elements) describing several stages of 
the same regime. Due to the low number of observations (several values are missing for some variables), 
not all control variables are included at the same time in the regressions.  
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3. Results 
Baseline models replicating Breitmeier et al.’s (2011) regressions (without the country differentiation 
variables) are included in Appendixes 4 and 5 for comparison. Tables1 to 3 present the results of the 
effect of differential treatment on signature failure (H1), compliance (H2) and problem solving 
effectiveness (H3), respectively.  
The results in Table 1 show a consistently significant positive effect of country differentiation on the 
likelihood that potential regime signatories that participated in the negotiations did not sign the agreement 
in the end. This result is against the theoretical expectations, and fails to provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
A potential explanation for this unexpected result, already discussed shortly above, is the broadness of the 
signature_failure variable. A better indicator of the likelihood that states become parties to the agreement 
would be the number of states that eventually did become parties, divided by the number of potential 
parties. Another possible explanation is that countries that do not benefit from the differential treatment 
may be less likely to enter an agreement in which such provisions are in place. The Kyoto Protocol, which 
was never ratified by the US, is an example of such a case. Already during the democratic Clinton 
government, the US Senate failed to ratify the treaty because it did not meet the minimum requirements it 
had set for such ratification (Mathews 2000). Among these unmet requirements was the one of 
“meaningful participation of developing countries in binding commitments limiting greenhouse gases”, 
which is one of the critical differential treatment provisions in the Kyoto Protocol. Once Bush took seat 
as US president, opposition to the treaty only increased. 
Interestingly, however, the finance variables show a negative effect on signature failure, which is robust to 
different combinations of the control variables (not shown here but available on request). Particularly the 
variable finance_devctys, which indicates the existence of financial support for the participation of 
developing countries in negotiations, is relatively close to significance, and in some other regression 
specifications becomes significant at the 5% level. The variable finance_compensate is, in contrast, never 
really close to significance. This effect would mean that one particular form of differential treatment, 
providing support for developing countries to participate in negotiations, increases the likelihood that 
states become parties to the agreement, which is in line with Hypothesis 1.  
Table 2 shows that differential treatment tends to increase the likelihood that states will comply with the 
agreement, supporting Hypothesis 2. The results are however not completely robust and the statistical 
significance is relatively low. Again, this is likely related to the low number of observations. None of the 
finance variables seems to have a clear effect on compliance: the results are never significant and also their 
sign is not consistent across different specifications tested but not shown in Table 2. 
In terms of Hypothesis 3, while in Table 3 we see a positive relationship between differential treatment 
and problem-solving effectiveness, the coefficients are never close to significance. This means that, while 
we fail to find support for the hypothesis that differential treatment reduces the likelihood that the 
agreement will be effective, we also fail to find support that it increases such likelihood. Quite surprisingly, 
provision of finance has a significant and negative effect on problem-solving effectiveness, which is robust 
to several specifications tested but not shown here. Such finding goes beyond Hypothesis 3 and is again 
difficult to explain. Our theory is that differential treatment reduces effectiveness as it waters down 
environmental commitments in the regime, and as it creates additional incentives for benefitted countries 
to lobby for the continuation of privileges, reducing the ability of the regime to evolve in time and 
increase its scope. But the empirical finding so far refers only to the provision of finance – it is difficult to 
explain why providing finance for the participation of developing countries in negotiations or for 
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compensation or subsidization of compliance costs would reduce effectiveness instead of increasing it. 
Further research is needed to clarify this finding.   
 
Table 1: Effect of differential treatment on signature failure 
  (SIGN1) (SIGN2) (SIGN3) (SIGN4) (SIGN5) (SIGN6) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 clustered  
errors 
clustered  
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
                          
any_differentiation 2.363 *** 2.275 *** 2.706 *** 1.779 ** 3.114 *** 3.204 ** 
 (0.853)  (0.877)  (0.890)  (0.822)  (1.187)  (1.262)  
finance_devctys         -1.286    
         (0.782)    
finance_compensate           -0.923  
           (1.240)  
problem_understood -0.630  -0.783 * -0.993 ** -0.849 * -1.087 *** -1.089 ** 
 (0.422)  (0.414)  (0.452)  (0.481)  (0.414)  (0.424)  
malignancy -0.339  -0.326  -0.343  -0.355  -1.024 *** -1.003 *** 
 (0.273)  (0.261)  (0.259)  (0.235)  (0.286)  (0.244)  
ruleused_mode -0.886  -0.742  -0.613    0.204  -0.0813  
 (0.683)  (0.726)  (0.779)    (1.042)  (0.972)  
powersetting_asymmetry 0.138  0.172  -0.120  0.786 * 1.714 *** 1.554 *** 
 (0.565)  (0.524)  (0.565)  (0.457)  (0.551)  (0.523)  
deep_rules   0.400  0.524  0.484      
   (0.367)  (0.350)  (0.371)      
rulebinding     0.973        
     (0.741)        
compliance_managerial       -0.0594      
       (0.794)      
Constant 2.927  1.685  -0.653  -1.420  1.884  2.539  
 (2.657)  (3.199)  (3.539)  (2.096)  (3.186)  (3.063)  
             
Observations 89   88   87   91   78   78   
Number of clusters 32  32  32  30  29  29  
Pseudo-R2 0.231  0.249  0.316  0.234  0.433  0.420  
Log likelihood -42.62   -41.31   -36.85   -40.22   -27.29   -27.92   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10.  
 
Going over to the control variables, a higher understanding about the problem being addressed reduces 
the chance of signature failure, increases the likelihood that states will comply with the agreement, and 
increases the problem-solving effectiveness of the agreement. These results are all in line with 
expectations, and correspond to the findings of Breitmeier et al. (2011). They are robust to the different 
specifications tried. In some cases, the results lose statistical significance, which is partly due to the low 
number of observations in the analysis, but the direction of the effect never changes.  
The malignancy of the problem being addressed has a negative effect both on the chance of signature 
failure and on compliance. These effects are robust in terms of their sign, and sometimes reach statistical 
significance. While the first one goes against expectations (one would expect that more complex problems 
are more likely to experience signature failure), the second one is in line with findings by Miles et al. 
(2002).  
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A higher power asymmetry between the negotiating states leads to a higher likelihood of signature failure 
and to a lower likelihood of compliance, but with weak statistical significance. These results however are 
in line with theoretical expectations expressed in Breitmeier et al. (2011). While this variable always 
displays negative coefficients in the regressions on effectiveness, these are never close to significance. 
Among the institutional variables, the depth of rules has a clearly positive effect on both compliance and 
effectiveness, which is also in line with previous findings, but has no clear effect on signature failure. A 
managerial approach to compliance appears to have a negative effect on effectiveness, but not to affect 
the other dependent variables in a meaningful way. No clear effects are found for the two other 
institutional variables: the type of rule used in decision-making, and whether the rules are mostly binding 
or not.  
 
Table 2: Effect of differential treatment on regime compliance 
  (COMP1) (COMP2) (COMP3) (COMP4) (COMP5) (COMP6) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered  
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
                          
any_differentiation 1.074  1.775 * 1.831 * -0.0122  1.255  1.717 * 
 (0.952)  (0.964)  (0.992)  (1.037)  (0.873)  (0.964)  
finance_devctys         1.338    
         (1.501)    
finance_compensate           -0.740  
           (0.969)  
problem_understood 0.747 * 0.741 ** 0.798 * 0.637  0.890 ** 0.642  
 (0.384)  (0.368)  (0.419)  (0.526)  (0.384)  (0.414)  
malignancy -0.541 ** -0.355  -0.341  -0.124  -0.765 ** -0.733 ** 
 (0.264)  (0.281)  (0.288)  (0.213)  (0.335)  (0.313)  
ruleused_mode -0.832  -0.495  -0.455    -1.462  -1.102  
 (0.903)  (0.853)  (0.880)    (0.929)  (0.941)  
powersetting_asymmetry -0.224  -0.615  -0.568  -1.191 * -0.379  -0.332  
 (0.474)  (0.569)  (0.576)  (0.682)  (0.558)  (0.488)  
deep_rules   0.826 * 0.859 * 1.105 **     
   (0.450)  (0.476)  (0.472)      
rulebinding     -0.596        
     (0.627)        
compliance_managerial       -0.275      
       (1.628)      
Constant 5.354 * 1.855  2.962  2.056  7.953 ** 7.666 ** 
 (3.187)  (3.148)  (3.124)  (2.862)  (3.613)  (3.446)  
             
Observations 79   77   77   88   66   66   
Number of clusters 30  30  30  31  26  26  
Pseudo-R2 0.241  0.315  0.322  0.346  0.345  0.326  
Log likelihood -25.53  -22.82  -22.58  -21.70  -19.47  -20.03  
% correct predictions 87.34   81.82   83.12   92.05   89.39   87.88   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10.  
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Table 3: Effect of differential treatment on regime problem-solving effectiveness 
  (EFF1) (EFF2) (EFF3) (EFF4) (EFF5) (EFF6) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
clustered 
errors 
                          
any_differentiation 0.370  0.160  0.235  0.636  0.757  1.060  
 (0.679)  (0.703)  (0.726)  (0.623)  (0.707)  (0.770)  
finance_devctys         -3.974 ***   
         (1.244)    
finance_compensate           -1.715 * 
           (0.985)  
problem_understood 0.544 ** 0.466 * 0.479  0.335  0.465 * 0.481 * 
 (0.252)  (0.276)  (0.300)  (0.322)  (0.250)  (0.252)  
malignancy -0.115  -0.0969  -0.0864  -0.0199  -0.139  -0.181  
 (0.151)  (0.161)  (0.164)  (0.172)  (0.139)  (0.161)  
ruleused_mode -0.652  -0.451  -0.352    0.245  -0.609  
 (0.444)  (0.448)  (0.457)    (0.511)  (0.574)  
powersetting_asymmetry -0.0305  -0.00945  0.216  0.0241  0.213  -0.0306  
 (0.265)  (0.238)  (0.328)  (0.291)  (0.313)  (0.321)  
deep_rules   0.534 ** 0.564 ** 0.622 **     
   (0.242)  (0.230)  (0.275)      
rulebinding     -0.567        
     (0.479)        
compliance_managerial       -1.644 *     
       (0.956)      
Constant 0.199  -1.636  -1.197  -1.937  -1.144  0.767  
 (1.738)  (2.142)  (2.293)  (2.050)  (1.839)  (2.159)  
             
Observations 99   97   96   104   86   86   
Number of clusters 33  33  33  33  30  30  
Pseudo-R2 0.0712  0.125  0.133  0.155  0.338  0.153  
Log likelihood -63.17   -58.50   -57.42   -60.49   -39.41   -50.40   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10.  
 
4. Conclusions and way forward 
Differential treatment of parties to international environmental agreements has become a common feature 
of international law. In this article, I propose three hypotheses about how such differential treatment may 
affect three different stages of regime implementation: signature, compliance and problem-solving 
effectiveness.  
The results found so far clearly indicate that differential treatment of parties to IEAs has an effect on 
regime implementation, although some of the findings are unexpected and require further analysis. I fail to 
find support for the first hypothesis, that differential treatment increases the likelihood that states will 
become parties to the agreement. Potential reasons for this finding are, empirically, the very broad 
dependent variable used in the analysis and, theoretically, the reasoning that countries that are not to be 
benefitted by differential treatment decide not to enter the agreement due to feared opposition of the 
agreement to their interests. At the same time, this first hypothesis is supported by the finding that one 
particular form of differential treatment, providing support for developing countries to participate in 
negotiations, increases the likelihood that states become parties to the agreement.  I find support for the 
second hypothesis which posits that differential treatment increases the likelihood of state compliance 
with the agreement, although the results are somewhat statistically weak, probably due to the low number 
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of observations included in the analysis. In this case, however, I do not find any additional effect of 
provision of finance on compliance.  Finally, I do not find any evidence to support the third hypothesis, 
which is that differential treatment reduces the likelihood that an agreement will be effective in solving the 
problem it addresses. Rather surprisingly, I find that the provision of finance decreases such likelihood, 
which I cannot so far explain.  
While acknowledging the limitations of this study, these findings provide a good starting point for further 
analysis. Empirically, the study is limited due to the low number of observations that can be used for 
analysis, which generally reduces significance levels of regression results, and which is particularly 
problematic in the case of logistic regression, as this type of regression relies on maximum likelihood 
estimation and hence on asymptotic assumptions. In addition, some of the variables used so far are, as 
explained above, very broad and may not reflect the actual features being modelled. Finally, differential 
treatment is not always implemented in the same way.  As exemplified in Appendix 1 and discussed in 
detail by Rajamani (2006), different IEAs have designed differential treatment in various ways, and these 
different designs may themselves be quite relevant for regime compliance and effectiveness. For example, 
in the case of the climate change regime, quite rigid groups with and without commitments were 
established on the basis of fixed country lists. In contrast, in other cases, objective criteria were established 
under which countries would adopt commitments or not. The Montreal Protocol, for example, includes a 
clear criterion to define the countries with preferential treatment as those developing countries “whose 
annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Annex A is less than 0.3 kilograms 
per capita […]”(UNEP 2000). The resulting expectation is that, if negotiators agree early on upon 
automatic ‘graduation rules’ from one group to the other, or upon attaching privileges to the relevant 
country characteristics rather than to fixed country lists, then potential negative effects of differential 
treatment upon long-term environmental effectiveness might be overcome. 
Bearing these limitations in mind, hence, the next steps in this research project will be to refine the 
statistical analysis in at least two ways: by including a more detailed coding of differential treatment, and 
by performing at least some of the analysis at the country-level, which would allow me to increase the 
number of observations significantly and also to test hypotheses differentiating countries that benefit from 
differential treatment from countries that do not. In addition, to find answers to some of the puzzling 
findings so far, this statistical analysis will be complemented with a qualitative, more in-depth comparative 
analysis of some IEAs with different design features of differential treatment.   
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Appendix 1: Differential treatment provisions in some IEAs 
IEA Year signature 
/ entry into 
force 
Developing 
country parties 
(G77) 
Industrialized 
country parties 
(OECD) 
Other parties 
(EITs and 
others) 
% of all 
countries 
Type of differential treatment Relevant text extracts (not exhaustive) 
World Heritage 
Convention 
1972 / 1975 128 30 31 95% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Each party "will do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its own 
resources and, where appropriate, with any international assistance 
and co-operation, in particular, financial, artistic, scientific and 
technical, which it may be able to obtain."; "Any State Party to this 
Convention may request international assistance for property 
forming part of the cultural or natural heritage of outstanding 
universal value situated within its territory." 
CITES 1973 / 1975 121 30 28 90% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
creates a Trust Fund "to provide financial support for the aims of 
the Convention"; while no country differentiation is explicit in the 
treaty text, most protected species are in developing countries 
Vienna 
Convention 
1985 / 1988 132 30 35 99% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
takes into account "the circumstances and particular requirements of 
developing countries" 
Montreal 
Protocol 
1987 / 1989 132 30 35 99% Context to implementation 
Delayed compliance schedules 
Flexible base years 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
"Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated 
level of consumption of the controlled substances in Annex A is less 
than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of 
the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter until 1 January 1999, shall, 
in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay for ten 
years its compliance with the control measures set out in Articles 2A 
to 2E [...]" "special provision is required to meet the needs of 
developing countries, including the provision of additional financial 
resources and access to relevant technologies" 
Basel 
Convention 
1989 / 1992 120 29 30 90% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
Participation assistance 
takes into account "the limited capabilities of the developing 
countries to manage hazardous wastes"; recognizes the need to 
"promote the transfer of technology for the sound management of 
hazardous wastes […], particularly to the developing countries"  
Basel 
Convention Ban 
Amendment 
1995 / not yet 34 23 15 36% Different central obligations 
Context to implementation 
Soft approach to non-compliance 
"transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially to 
developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an 
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes" hazardous 
waste exports for final disposal and recycling are banned from 
Annex VII countries (EU, OECD and Liechtenstein) to non-Annex 
VII countries (all other parties) 
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IEA Year signature 
/ entry into 
force 
Developing 
country parties 
(G77) 
Industrialized 
country parties 
(OECD) 
Other parties 
(EITs and 
others) 
% of all 
countries 
Type of differential treatment Relevant text extracts (not exhaustive) 
Convention on 
Biological 
Diversity 
1992 / 1993 132 29 32 97% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
Capacity building 
"the provision of new and additional financial resources and 
appropriate access to relevant technologies can be expected to make 
a substantial difference in the world's ability to address the loss of 
biological diversity" "special provision is required to meet the needs 
of developing countries" 
UNFCCC 1992 / 1994 131 30 34 98% Different central obligations 
Context to implementation 
Flexible base years 
Delayed reporting schedule 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
Capacity building 
Negotiation, participation and 
reporting assistance 
notes "that the largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, 
that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively 
low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing 
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs"; 
"[…] the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof"; "The 
specific needs and special circumstances of developing country 
Parties, […] should be given full consideration"; "The developed 
country Parties […] shall provide new and additional financial 
resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
country Parties in complying with their obligations [...]" 
Convention to 
Combat 
Desertification 
1994 / 1996 131 30 34 98% Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
Capacity building 
Participation assistance 
"the high concentration of developing countries, notably the least 
developed countries, among those experiencing serious drought 
and/or desertification, and the particularly tragic consequences of 
these phenomena in Africa"; "the importance of the provision to 
affected developing countries, particularly in Africa, of effective 
means, inter alia, substantial financial resources [...] and access to 
technology, without which it will be difficult for them to implement 
fully their commitments under the Convention" 
Kyoto Protocol 1997 / 2005 132 29 31 96% Different central obligations 
Context to implementation 
Financial assistance 
Technology transfer 
Capacity building 
Negotiation and participation 
assistance 
Soft approach to non-compliance 
"The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure 
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed 
their assigned amounts […]"; "the developed country Parties and 
other developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention 
shall [...] Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the 
agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing 
the implementation of existing commitments [...]" 
Source: Adapted and updated from Rajamani {%Rajamani 2006\, p. 94-121. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description 
effect_compliance 120 0.8417 0.3666 0 1 The regime has had a positive causal effect on conformity with regime provisions 
effect_problemchange 145 0.3931 0.4901 0 1 The regime has had a positive causal effect on improvement of problem addressed 
signature_failure 127 0.2913 0.4562 0 1 Did potential signatories take part in negotiations but fail to sign agreement? 
any_differentiation 167 0.5269 0.5008 0 1 Is there any type of differentiation of regime members? 
finance_devctys 119 0.3193 0.4682 0 1 Does the financial mechanism support developing country participation? 
finance_compensate 119 0.1597 0.3678 0 1 Does the financial mechanism provide compensation/subsidies for activities/compliance? 
problem_understood 168 2.7381 0.8907 1 4 Was the nature of the problem well understood? 
malignancy 154 6.4935 2.2000 2 11 How malignant (complex and with incompatible interests) is the problem? 
ruleused_mode 119 2.1008 0.5733 1 3 Decision rule most frequently applied in practice (higher = tougher) 
powersetting_asymmetry 162 2.8395 0.9386 1 5 Were parties' power resources symmetrical or sharply different? 
deep_rules 163 3.0184 1.1193 1 5 Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of its 
rulebinding 157 2.6752 0.7181 1 3 Is the rule legally binding? (mode within case_id) 
compliance_managerial 121 0.9008 0.3001 0 1 Do procedures reflect a management (rather than enforcement) approach to compliance? 
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Appendix 3: Correlation table 
  effect_ 
compliance 
effect_ 
problem 
change 
signature_ 
failure 
any_differ 
entiation 
finance_ 
devctys 
finance_ 
compensate 
problem_ 
understood 
malignancy ruleused_ 
mode 
powersetting 
_asymmetry 
deep_ 
rules 
rule 
binding 
compliance_ 
managerial 
effect_compliance 1 
            effect_problemchange 0.1516 1 
           signature_failure -0.0262 0.331 1 
          any_differentiation -0.031 0.1973 0.4554 1 
         finance_devctys -0.3382 -0.3742 -0.0089 0.1704 1 
        finance_compensate -0.1947 -0.463 -0.1367 0.3201 0.5323 1 
       problem_understood 0.4407 0.2779 -0.3275 -0.1115 -0.2524 -0.4162 1 
      malignancy -0.4214 -0.0946 -0.1313 0.2316 0.0776 0.1723 -0.1435 1 
     ruleused_mode 0.0423 -0.0148 -0.0912 -0.0576 0.1245 0.2339 0.0597 -0.2925 1 
    powersetting_asymmetry -0.4165 0.0749 0.3216 0.327 -0.028 -0.0527 -0.2384 0.6037 -0.3126 1 
   deep_rules 0.2484 0.519 0.2341 -0.0979 -0.3277 -0.4763 0.2219 -0.2477 -0.1536 0.046 1 
  rulebinding -0.0201 -0.1539 0.2947 0.348 0.1103 -0.1228 0.0984 0.1344 -0.0373 0.4503 0.1547 1 
 compliance_managerial 0.1994 -0.1133 -0.0389 -0.0639 0.0993 0.1866 -0.108 -0.1476 0.4654 -0.3068 -0.1357 -0.1461 1 
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Appendix 4: Baseline models: Determinants of regime compliance  
 (BL1) (BL2) (BL3) (BL4) (BL5) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors 
                      
problem_understood 0.761 * 0.731 ** 0.763 ** 1.651 * 0.637  
 (0.395)  (0.361)  (0.382)  (0.863)  (0.520)  
malignancy -0.535 ** -0.441  -0.442  -0.437  -0.124  
 (0.266)  (0.306)  (0.314)  (0.287)  (0.207)  
ruleused_mode -0.887  -0.717  -0.707  -0.986    
 (1.121)  (1.143)  (1.160)  (1.117)    
powersetting_asymmetry -0.0438  -0.182  -0.125  -0.667  -1.192 * 
 (0.444)  (0.541)  (0.563)  (1.024)  (0.712)  
deep_rules   0.575  0.585  1.063  1.106 ** 
   (0.412)  (0.418)  (0.773)  (0.479)  
rulebinding     -0.504      
     (0.493)      
compliance_managerial       2.896 * -0.278  
       (1.544)  (1.557)  
Constant 5.513  3.376  4.533  -0.728  2.055  
 (3.705)  (4.116)  (4.325)  (3.741)  (2.872)  
           
Observations 79   77   77   65   88   
Number of clusters 30  30  30  27  31  
Pseudo-R2 0.215  0.255  0.260  0.472  0.346  
Log likelihood -26.43  -24.83  -24.67  -13.80  -21.70  
% correct predictions 87.34   83.12   83.12   90.77   92.05   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. These models replicate the 
regressions in Breitmeier et al. (2011), with slightly differently specified variables.  
 
  
20 
 
Appendix 5: Baseline models: Determinants of regime problem-solving effectiveness  
  (BL6) (BL7) (BL8) (BL9) (BL10) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors clustered errors 
                      
problem_understood 0.555 ** 0.472 * 0.486  0.422  0.348  
 (0.254)  (0.281)  (0.305)  (0.316)  (0.320)  
malignancy -0.103  -0.0941  -0.0817  -0.134  0.00430  
 (0.142)  (0.158)  (0.160)  (0.174)  (0.176)  
ruleused_mode -0.717  -0.477  -0.393  -0.785    
 (0.496)  (0.476)  (0.486)  (0.508)    
powersetting_asymmetry 0.00831  0.00925  0.233  0.194  0.0858  
 (0.230)  (0.207)  (0.316)  (0.234)  (0.262)  
deep_rules   0.539 ** 0.568 ** 0.499 * 0.650 ** 
   (0.242)  (0.231)  (0.267)  (0.276)  
rulebinding     -0.543      
     (0.471)      
compliance_managerial       0.0586  -1.464  
       (0.827)  (0.932)  
Constant 0.343  -1.587  -1.138  -1.014  -2.152  
 (1.770)  (2.114)  (2.245)  (2.204)  (2.015)  
           
Observations 99   97   96   82   104   
Number of clusters 33  33  33  30  33  
Pseudo-R2 0.0666  0.124  0.131  0.132  0.143  
Log likelihood -63.48  -58.55  -57.53  -49.25  -61.37  
% correct predictions 68.69   68.04   67.71   63.41   67.31   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10. These models replicate the 
regressions in Breitmeier et al. (2011), with slightly differently specified variables.  
 
 
 
 
